22 January 2012
Stephen
M. Apatow *
Founder,
Director of Research & Development
Humanitarian
Resource Institute
Humanitarian University
Consortium Graduate Studies
Center
for Medicine, Veterinary Medicine & Law
Phone:
203-668-0282
Email:
s.m.apatow@humanitarian.net
Internet:
www.humanitarian.net
Pathobiologics
International
Internet:
www.pathobiologics.org
* Founder: Humanitarian
Resource Institute: NGO:Consultative Listing: NGO Branch:
United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).
Media
focus on H5N1 Research - BSL Lab
Dear
Colleagues and Associates:
The
recent media focus on H5N1 Research demonstrates the importance of
education regarding the dangers presented in any BSL
4 lab:
In Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4)
laboratories, scientists study some of the world's potentially most
dangerous microbes. These labs are designed to prevent microbes from
being released into the environment and to provide maximum safety for
the scientists. When a laboratory is designated BSL-4, that means the
highest possible containment measures are in place. -- National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases.
Continuing
with the TDR
TB - H5N1 - China: Immunity: discussion (HRI:PI,
21 January 2012) on the 1918 pandemic, avian TB and antibiotic variable
with mortality... today's focus needs to be the clinical
challenge presented by TDR TB and all drug resistant
strains in Co-infection. See: Influenza:
Biodefense and Epidemiological Tracking:
Substantive
discussions also include the importance of molecular
diagnostics, bioinformatics, the evolution of a novel strain, and
realtime vaccine development. See: Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Biodefense and Epidemiological
Tracking:
The genes of SARS-CoV were compared with
the corresponding genes of known coronaviruses of humans, pigs, cattle,
dogs, cats, mice, rats, chickens, and turkeys.
Each gene of SARS-CoV has only 70% or less identity with the
corresponding
gene of the known coronaviruses. Thus, SARS-CoV is only dis-tantly
related
to the known coronaviruses of humans and animals. Phylogenetic analysis
suggests that SARS-CoV does not fit within any of the three groups that
contain all other known coronaviruses. -- SARS
coronavirus: a new challenge for prevention and therapy: Holmes, J. Clin. Invest. 111:1605–1609
(2003). doi:10.1172/JCI200318819.
For additional information, visit the: HRI
Bioinformatics: Pathobiological Diagnostics Site.
###
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21
January 2012
Stephen
M. Apatow *
Founder,
Director of Research & Development
Humanitarian
Resource Institute
Humanitarian University
Consortium Graduate Studies
Center
for Medicine, Veterinary Medicine & Law
Phone:
203-668-0282
Email:
s.m.apatow@humanitarian.net
Internet:
www.humanitarian.net
Pathobiologics
International
Internet:
www.pathobiologics.org
* Founder: Humanitarian
Resource Institute: NGO:Consultative Listing: NGO Branch:
United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).
TDR TB
- H5N1 - China: Immunity
Dear
Colleagues and Associates:
Recent
international public health contingency planning discussions [1]
have resulted in coordinated efforts to manage health crises and tackle
serious cross-border health threats [2] associated with high
consequence pathogens, especially those that have the capacity to
spread across the globe in 24-48 hours via air travel, and in a worst
case scenario shut down world trade and travel for 12-24 months.
[3]
One of the most serious discussion topics has been in regards to
TDR-TB. [4,5]
In
the context of sound science being the basis for global discussions
on the threat presented by the H5N1 Avian Influenza strain, I would
like to open discussion regarding the seroprevalence data referenced in
the following paper and how such information shapes our view of human
infection, global spread of the pathogen and widespread atypical
infections [6]:
A large
part of the current bird-flu hysteria is fostered by a
distrust among the lay and scientific community regarding the actual
state of our knowledge regarding the bird flu or H5N1 and the killer
‘‘Influenza’’ Pandemic of 1918 that it is compared to. And this
distrust is not completely unfounded. Traditionally, ‘‘flu’’ does not
kill. Experts, including Peter Palese of the Mount School of
Medicine in Manhattan, remind us that even in 1992, millions in China
already had antibodies to H5N1, meaning that they had contracted it and
that their immune system had little trouble fending it off. Dr.
Andrew Noymer and Michel Garenne, UC Berkely demographers, reported in
2000 convincing statistics showing that undetected tuberculosis may
have been the real killer in the 1918 flu epidemic. Aware of recent
attempts to isolate the ‘‘Influenza virus’’ on human cadavers and their
specimens, Noymer and Garenne summed that: ‘‘Frustratingly, these
findings have not answered the question why the 1918 virus was so
virulent, nor do they offer an explanation for the unusual age profile
of deaths’’. Bird flu would certainly be diagnosed in the hospital
today as Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS). Roger and others
favor suspecting tuberculosis in all cases of acute respiratory failure
of unknown origin. -- Bird flu,
influenza and 1918: The case for mutant Avian tuberculosis: Medical
Hypotheses (2006) 67, 1006–1015. [7]
Looking
forward to your feedback on (1) H5N1 immunity, (2) our TDR-TB
challenge, global spread through wildlife and integration into the
global ecosystem and (3) Avian tuberculosis: Medical Hypotheses as it
relates to todays infectious disease landscape.
New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health
threat and will complicate US and global security over the next 20
years. These diseases will endanger US citizens at home and abroad,
threaten US armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate social and
political instability in key countries and regions in which the United
States has significant interests.
-- The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the
United States: National Intelligence Council, January 2000. [8]
References:
- HUMINT OPSEC -
Molecular Diagnostics Discussion: Stephen M. Apatow, 9 January
2012. Url: http://www.unarts.org/H-II/ref/192012OPSEC.html
- EU
Health Newsletter: Issue 83, 19 January 2012. Url:
http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/newsletter/83/newsletter_en.htm
- SARS Down
But Still a Threat: National Intelligence Council, Intelligence
Community Assessment, August 2003. Url:
http://www.humanitarian.net/law/ref/sars_nic82003.pdf
- Totally Drug Resistant Tuberculosis:
Clinicians Biodefense Network. Url: http://www.upmc-cbn.org/
- Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Needed to Address an International Public
Health Emergency: Pathobiologics International,November 2006. Url:
http://www.pathobiologics.org/btac/UNIHR1292007.html
- PRO/AH>
Avian influenza, human (140): atypical infections,
05-SEP-2006
20060905.2522. Url:
http://www.pathobiologics.org/ivphc/ref/h5n1_200609052522.html
- Bird
flu, influenza and 1918:
The case for mutant Avian tuberculosis: Medical Hypotheses (2006) 67,
1006–1015. Url:
http://drbroxmeyer.netfirms.com/001pdfBIRDFLUEDITORIALPUBLISHED.pdf
- The Global
Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the
United States: National Intelligence Council, January 2000. Url:
http://www.dni.gov/nic/special_globalinfectious.html
Related:
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