In The News
Overview & Notes for Presentation: AVBC 8th Annual Meeting, "Bioterrorism
and the Biologics Industry" (Panel Discussion followed keynote presentations),
5 November 2003
Slide 1: Biodefense
& Agricultural Security
Protecting one
of America’s Critical Infrastructures
Stephen M.
Apatow
President, Humanitarian
Resource Institute
Director of Research
& Development
Reference Notes:
Biographical Sketch:
Stephen M. Apatow, President and Director of Research and Development, of
the nonprofit organization Humanitarian Resource Institute, is a specialist
in strategic planning and project development of initiatives associated with
human medicine, veterinary medicine and U.S. and international law. Current
programs include the internet based Biodefense Reference Library, Foreign
Animal and Zoonotic Disease Center, Bioinformatics: Pathobiological Diagnostics
Center and Biodefense Legal Reference Library. Educational resource development
for the veterinary and medical community include the Foreign Animal Disease
Online Course and the Zoonotic Disease Online Review. To enhance collaboration
between Humanitarian Resource Institute and the international community of
scholars, the Humanitarian University Consortium was formed to enhance the
development of initiatives associated with economic, social, cultural and
humanitarian issues worldwide.
Slide 2: Background
• NCADI:
Strategic planning, project development and analysis
• GDSAIM:
New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services
• Human Services
U.S. Campaign
• Formation
of Humanitarian Resource Institute in 1994
• Development
of America's National Community Needs Database
• El Nino:
FEMA Community & Family Preparedness Program
Reference Notes:
1990: National
Clearinghouse for Alcohol & Drug Information Project
Initiative opens
the first the toll free hotline (1-800-Say-No-To-Drugs) providing public
access to the Federal Resource for Drug & Alcohol Information.
• Strategic
planning and development of the 6000 mile transcontinental campaign through
270 cities in 17 states.
• Grass roots
networking encompassed federal, state and local elected officials, municipalities,
state and county education departments, youth programs, interfaith community
and media.
• Coordination
of press conferences and media events.
• The initiative
is the largest touch outreach campaign ever coordinated through the Office
for Substance Abuse Prevention.
1991: U.S.A.
Education/Prevention Resource Campaign
• Strategic
planning of pilot project coordinated in cooperation with the New York State
Division of Substance Abuse Services to develop "Guidelines for the dissemination
of Substance Abuse Information and Materials."
• The guideline
was developed to help programs effectively network public health information
down to the household level through multiple communication pathways that already
exist in communities.
1993: National
Human Services Campaign
• U.S.
House Select Committee on Hunger, facilitated coalition of 20 national organizations.
• Initiative
targets humanitarian relief efforts in the United States.
• Strategic
planning and development of the 3000 mile transcontinental campaign through
133 cities in 11 states.
• Grass roots
networking encompassed federal, state and local elected officials, municipalities,
state and county education departments, youth programs, interfaith community
and media.
• Coordination
of press conferences and media events.
1994-Present:
Humanitarian Resource Institute: Strategic planning, research and project
development for all U.S. and International initiatives in cooperation with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Department of Agriculture,
American Red Cross, National 4-H, U.S. Chemical and Hazard Safety Investigation
Board and United Nations programs.
1999: Year 2000
Conversion Global Campaign
• Strategic
Planning and development of an international education initiative to provide
research reports, infrastructure risk statistics and resources relating to
contingency planning for the Year 2000 conversion.
• Communication
networks included corporate and inter-governmental programs, newspaper, radio,
television and media networks in approximately 195 countries.
Slide 3: Current
Projects
• America's
National Community Needs Database
Grassroots network to county and municipal leadership
• Biodefense
Reference Library:
Academic Discussion Platform
Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Center
Foreign Animal Disease Online Course
Zoonotic Disease Online Review
• Bioinformatics:
Pathobiological Diagnostics
• Biodefense
and Epidemiological Tracking
• Bioterrorism:
Contingency Planning Resources
• Medical
& Veterinary Reference, Research & Publications
Reference Notes:
Slide 4: Current
Projects
• Community
& Family Preparedness Network
• Emerging
Infectious Disease Network
West Nile Virus (WNV) Reference Library
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Reference Library
AIDS/HIV Reference Library
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) Reference Library
Bioterrorism: Contingency Planning Resources
Medical & Veterinary Reference, Research & Publications
• Global Community
Needs Database
• International
Disaster Information NetworkReference Notes:
Slide 5: Current
Projects
• Global
Preparedness & Response Network
News & Information
Terrorism
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Chemical & Hazardous Materials Risks
Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Severe Weather: Preparedness Resources
• HRI Legal
Resource & Assistance Center
U.S. & International Security Reference Library
Biodefense Reference Library
International Law
Human Rights
Treaties
Reference Notes:
Slide 6: Current
Projects
• Humanitarian
University Consortium: Founded in 2002 to support the development of
initiatives associated with economic, social, cultural and humanitarian issues
worldwide. Our mission is to serve as:
(1) an international community of scholars.
(2) a bridge between Humanitarian Resource Institute and the international
academic community.
(3) a think tank in support of the United Nations programs.
(4) the promotion of higher learning through both traditional and distance
education.
Reference Notes:
Slide 7: Communication
Networks
• United
States Networks:
Grassroots Networks (Household Level)
Corporate
Municipal, State and Federal Government
Community Action and Interfaith Organizations – approx. 3,100 Counties.
• International
Networks:
Newspaper, Radio and Television
Corporate
Intergovernmental, Non Governmental, United Nations
Community Action and Interfaith Organizations- approx. 195 countries.
• Humanitarian
University Consortium: UNESCO membership, college/university level, WHO,
OIE, FAO.
Reference Notes:
International
network development led to the formation of the media company SMAMedia
Communications in the early 90’s. Focus strategic planning and project
development, press release distribution and media integration. Continually
working on optimization of network/resource development, definition
of target audiences, intact communication networks to key players on an international,
national, grass roots level for educational initiatives, advocacy work, etc.
Slide 8: Biodefense
& Epidemiological Tracking
• West
Nile Virus
• Foot and
Mouth
• Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
• Monkeypox
Reference Notes:
Slide 9: West
Nile Virus (WNV)
• West
Nile virus was first isolated in the West Nile District of Uganda in 1937.
The ecology was characterized in Egypt in the 1950s.
• The virus
became recognized as a cause of severe human meningoencephalitis (inflammation
of the spinal cord and brain) in elderly patients during an outbreak in Israel
in 1957.
• Equine disease
was first noted in Egypt and France in the early 1960s.
• The first
appearance of WNV in North America in 1999, in humans and horses, and the
subsequent spread in the United States may be an important milestone in the
evolving history of this virus.
CDC: West Nile
Virus, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Vector-Borne
Infectious Diseases.
Reference Notes:
West Nile Virus,
import export issues, trade restrictions were implemented from Europe and
I proceeded to facilitate research and recommendations to the equestrian
industry.
Slide 10:
West Nile Virus – Equestrian Cases
• In August
1999, 22 horses in the Riverhead area of Long Island began showing signs
of an encephalitic infection: lethargy, weakness in the hindquarters, and
convulsions. Local veterinarians suspected the horse deaths and illnesses
were caused by equine protozoal myelitis.On Oct 19, after 13 of the horses
had died or were euthanized, the USDA-APHIS announced they all tested positive
for the West Nile virus.Horses are highly susceptible to the virus — a 1996
report from Egypt indicated 40 percent mortality.
Reference Notes:
Ground zero for
this outbreak was New York city.
Slide 11:
West Nile Virus – Bird Migration
Reference Notes:
Scope of WNV
spread: Epidemiology - USGS - Dr. Robert G. McLean, one of the sharpest scientists
I have consulted with through the years, director of the USGS National Wildlife
Health Center in Madison, Wis., -- Bird species/migration/spread discussion.
12.14.99: West
Nile Virus May Be New Deadly Strain, USGS Tells Congress: Recent crow die-offs
suggest the West Nile virus which emerged in New York in late August could
be more deadly to North American bird species than to species in Africa,
the Middle East and Europe, where the virus is normally found, a USGS scientist
reported today at a congressional field hearing held in Connecticut by the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.Map: Caribbean/Western North
Atlantic migration pattern of the Common Tern (Sterna hirundo), as shown by
band returns.
Principal migration
routes used by birds in passing from North America to winter quarters in
the West Indies, Central America, and South America. Route 4 is the one used
most extensively while only a few species make the 2,400 mile flight down
Route 1 from Nova Scotia to South America.
• Initiatives:
8.5.2001: Tropical Storms, Hurricanes, Floods and Encephalitis Outbreaks.
• West Nile
Virus: Biopreparedness Through Community & Family Preparedness.
Slide 12:
West Nile Virus: 2002 Statistics
• 4,156
Human Cases
• 284 Fatalities
• 44 States
(2289 Counties)
• 111 bird
species - CDC's West Nile Virus avian mortality database.
w 14,358 equine
cases in 40 states were reported to USDA APHIS - nearly 20-fold the case
load reported by 20 states last year.
Reference Notes:
Widespread impact
throughout the North American Continent.
Slide 13:
West Nile Virus- Human Cases as of October 17, 2003
Reference Notes:
• West
Nile Virus: 2003 Human Cases as of October 22, 2003, 3am MDT:
• 7386 cases
reported to CDC
• 155 deaths
Slide 14:
Reference Notes:
USGS:CDC Epidemiological
Maps
Demonstrate the
progression of spread, demographic impact on human populations.
Slide 15:
Reference Notes:
USGS:CDC Epidemiological
Maps
Demonstrate the
progression of spread, demographic impact on avian populations.
Slide 16:
Reference Notes:
USGS:CDC Epidemiological
Maps
Demonstrate the
progression of spread, demographic impact: veterinary.
Veterinary, primarily
the equestrian industry:
This industry
directly produces goods and services of $25.3 billion and has a total impact
of $112.1 billion on U.S. gross domestic product. Racing, showing and
recreation each contribute more than 25% to the total value of goods and
services produced by the industry. The industry’s contribution
to the U.S. GDP is greater than the motion picture services, railroad transportation,
furniture and fixtures manufacturing and tobacco product manufacturing industries.
It is only slightly smaller than the apparel and other textile products manufacturing
industry.
Slide 17:
Communications / Resources
• West
Nile Virus: Biopreparedness Through Community & Family Preparedness
Resource outlines topics of source reduction for mosquitoes and how to reduce
risk of infection.
Developed in cooperation with the FEMA Community & Family Preparedness
Program post discussion and recommendations with contacts at the World Health
Organization, USGS, USDA, US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive
Medicine and Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at John Hopkins.
Reference Notes:
Engaged
the America’s National Community Needs Database Network to reach the Federal,
State, County and municipal leadership levels.
Slide 18:
West Nile Virus Reference Library
• Biodefense
and Epidemiological Tracking
• News and
Information
• Environmental
Protection Agency Information
• Research:
Arboviral Encephalitides
• Public Health
Alerts
• Research
and Reference Materials
Reference Notes:
Slide 19:
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
• Foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD) is a severe, highly communicable viral disease of cattle and
swine. It also affects sheep, goats, deer, and other cloven-hooved ruminants.
• This country
has been free of FMD since 1929, when the last of nine U.S. outbreaks was
eradicated.
Reference Notes:
A report by the
National Academies (Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism 2002) highlighted
the vulnerabilityof the food supply. Foot and mouth disease (FMD) was
identified as the most important animal disease that the USA must be prepared
for.
Slide 20:
UK FMD Outbreak – Equestrian Industry
• After
the first reported case of FMD on 2/21/01, virtually all horse related sporting
and recreational activity in UK ceased out of respect for the farming community,
including racing.
• British
Horse Society stated, "Britain’s 1,800 riding schools were reporting losses
of between 65-85% and some were completely closed.
• According
to Leo Jeffcott, Chairman of the FEI Veterinary Committee and dean of the
veterinary school at the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom, the
financial damage to the industry was extraordinary; pervading more businesses
than any thought possible.
“Those affected
included the saddlers, farriers, veterinary surgeons, feed, horse show caterers,
course designers, photographers, suppliers of tents, portable stables, cleaning
services, and so many more. The industry’s losses were estimated to reach
$141.6 million (£100 million) a month in March, April, and May 2001.”
Continuing in
the focus of advocacy work on behalf of the equestrian industry in the United
States, import/export issues.
Slide 21:
UK FMD Outbreak – Index Case
• Index
case found 20 days after estimated start of the outbreak.
• One month
after the index case, the number of determined infected farms was 707, with
342 infected premises that had not yet been detected.
Reference Notes:
Sec. European
Commission for the Control of FMD:When planning for an FMD outbreak, the “worst-case”
scenario is a large, multi-focus, country wide outbreak involving many dealers
& markets – Not a single focus or several regionalized foci.
Slide 22:
UK FMD Outbreak: Overview
• The United
Kingdom Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) contingency plan
envisaged up to ten outbreaks (premises).
• To the extent
that it was a conscious decision, the cull was used because it was realized
that actual tracing of the disease had become impossible.
Reference Notes:
Slide 22, 23,24:
The Power to Panic: The Animal Health Act 2002: David Campbell and
Robert Lee, Cardiff Law School and ESRC Research Centre for Business Relationships,
Accountability, Sustainability and Society (B.R.A.S.S.)
Slide 23:
UK FMD Outbreak: Overview
• The U.K.
government did not initially plan to carry out the contiguous cull in 2001.
It did so because its original policy for control of FMD completely collapsed.
• In the end,
of the over 7 million animals culled, perhaps 90% were uninfected, the result
of what has been called "postcode slaughter" or "carnage by computer".
Reference Notes:
Slide 24:
UK FMD Outbreak: Overview
• The debate
on the decision not to vaccinate was largely based on misunderstandings of
the E.U. and W.T.O. biosecurity and trade policies maintained by certain special
interest groups, notably the national leadership of the National Farmers'
Union.
• This issue
should have been settled earlier in any at all competent contingency planning;
but it still remains completely unsettled.
Reference Notes:
Slide 25:
UK FMD Outbreak: Statistics
• 10,472:
(number of premises recorded on which animals have been or are due to be slaughtered,
DEFRA, June 2003.)
• 10,791,000
animals culled (Meat and Livestock Commission): the UK breeding flock was
reduced by 13% (in England alone, by 18%), the UK breeding cattle herd
was reduced by 6%.
• Economic
cost: $20 billion (US) (Vannieuwenhoven , 2001 Convention News. American Veterinary
Medical Association. Wednesday, July 18, 2001.)
Reference Notes:
This figure is
but a remote expression of the concrete losses, which include: the premature
deaths of over 10 million animals, killed in ways which were almost always
unacceptably, indeed criminally, inhumane and very often so horribly cruel
as to be an occasion of lasting national shame; the loss of irreplaceable
special breeds; the horror experienced by those with a scrap of humanity
involved in the cull; the misery of thousands of small farmers and small businesspersons
in areas related to farming and tourism whose incomes were drastically reduced,
some of whom were driven into bankruptcy; the (continuing) pollution caused
by the disposal; the frustration of the enjoyment of the countryside for
a year.
Slide 26:
Communications / Resources
• Foot
& Mouth Disease Reference Library: a collaborative initiative of international
veterinary, medical and scientific experts to share information and enhance
academic discussion of emerging infectious diseases and issues associated
with preparedness, response, mitigation and policy.
News and Information
Discussion Topics
Research Papers and Reference Materials
FMD Information Sources
Reference Notes:
Humanitarian Resource
Institute facilitates the release of Tripartite Exercise 2000 Final Reports
through USDA for contingency planning on the federal, state, county and municipal
level.
Slide 27:
Biodefense & Epidemiological Tracking
• News
and Information:
EU Directive on FMD control: Adopted at Agriculture Council on 29 September.
See also: The Institute of Animal Health, Pirbright Laboratory: Foot-and-mouth
disease: scientific problems and recent progress 1st annual report.
Emergency Vaccination Moved to the Forefront of Control Measures Instead of
Being Last Resort: Foot and Mouth in the EU: 12 June 2003.
FMD: Mexican-US Campaign 1947-1954: Over 18 months, 76 million doses
of vaccine were produced, every lot was quality controlled and then applied,
resulting in eradication - Special thanks to J. Callis.
• Biodefense
• Genomic
• Education
• Law
Reference Notes:
Slide 28:
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
• In contrast
to the spread of West Nile Virus from the initial index case in New York
City throughout the North American Continent during the period from 1999-2003,
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) has crossed international boundaries
within a matter of weeks.
Reference Notes:
CDC Foundation:
” In early 2003, a worldwide outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) swept the globe with remarkable speed and complexity. CDC scientists
– and others around the world – continue to work around the clock to track
the disease and find ways to prevent and treat it.”
Slide 29:
SARS – Overview
• The World
Health Organization formally announced on 4/16/03 that a new pathogen, a member
of the coronavirus family never before seen in humans, is the cause of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).
• The molecular
phylogenies published 10 April in the New England Journal of Medicine were
based on small fragments from the polymerase gene (ORF 1b), and have placed
the SARS virus in a separate group somewhere between groups 2 and 3. However,
antibodies to the SARS virus cross react with FIPV, HuCV229E and TGEV, all
in Group 1. Furthermore, the SARS virus can grow in Vero green monkey kidney
cells, which no other coronavirus can, with the exception of porcine epidemic
diarrhea virus, also in Group 1.
Reference Notes:
On the HRI Bioinformaics:
Pathobiological Diagnostics web site we provide research associated with Comparative
analysis of the SARS coronavirus genome from The Institute of Microbiology
and Epidemiology of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and the Beijing
Genomics Institute of Chinese Academy of Sciences, CDC, Sequence information
provided by collaborators at National Microbiology Laboratory, Canada, University
of California at San Francisco, Erasmus University, Rotterdam and Bernhard-Nocht
Institute, Hamburg facilitated this sequencing effort.
Slide 30:
SARS – Intelligence Community Assessment
Although the
World Health Organization declared on 5 July that all transmission chains
of SARS had been broken, many health experts fear it could return again in
the fall when cooler temperatures return in temperate areas. We remain vulnerable.
• The possible
presence of animal reservoirs of the coronavirus that causes SARS and the
lack of a reliable diagnostic test or a vaccine preclude eradication.
• If a resurgence
of SARS this winter coincides with the annual outbreak of influenza, identifying
and isolating suspected SARS cases will be much more difficult. SARS also
could mutate, altering the symptoms, transmissibility, or lethality of the
disease.
• nAs the
first line of defense, healthcare systems and workers are particularly vulnerable.
Moreover, most wealthy countries have little recent experience implementing
large-scale quarantine and isolation programs, and poor countries already
have inadequate health surveillance and infection control procedures.
SARS: Down But
Still a Threat, National Intelligence Council. Intelligence Community Assessment,
August 2003.
Reference Notes:
Slide 31:
SARS – Impact
• 10.21.2003:
Federal officials propose masks for anyone with cough
Reference Notes:
Conflicting Messages:
WHO: No evidence
SARS is airborne: Mon Oct 20, 4:01 AM ET
By TERESA CEROJANO,
Associated Press Writer
ANILA, Philippines
- There is no evidence to suggest that SARS is an airborne virus, the World
Health Organization said Monday in a report that also found health workers
to be at special risk and children rarely affected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Clinicians Information
Network: Updates to CDC information and guidance, September 26 - October
17, 2003:
CDC FACT SHEET:
Guidance for SARS Preparedness for Infection Control
To prepare for
the possibility of the reemergence of SARS, health care facilities need to
plan now to create the infrastructure to deal with single or multiple cases
of SARS.
Transmission Risks:
Lessons Learned
Information from
the spring 2003 outbreak suggests that SARS is transmitted primarily through
close contact with infected persons. It is most likely spread via respiratory
droplets; however, the possibility of airborne transmission and spread through
contaminated objects cannot be excluded. Exposure to SARS patients around
the time an aerosol-generating procedure (e.g., intubation, bronchoscopy,
nebulizer treatment) is performed may increase transmission risks to healthcare
workers......
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal officials
propose masks for anyone with cough
10/21/03: ROB
STEIN: The Washington Post
-- The aggressive
new approach is outlined in a draft of a comprehensive plan for how the nation
should protect against and respond to a return of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS).
-- To minimize the
threat from SARS and other lung infections, federal health officials have
proposed that anyone who comes into a hospital, doctor's office or clinic
with a cough or other respiratory symptoms be required to immediately don
a surgical mask and be isolated from other patients until they can be diagnosed.
-- The draft contains
an array of recommendations, including many measures the nation has not seen
since the days when scourges like smallpox and tuberculosis were major public
health threats. In the event of a major outbreak, one proposal calls for
establishing separate hospitals to treat and segregate large numbers
of patients, in much the same way special TB sanitariums and smallpox hospitals
existed early in the 20th century.
-- That proposal
also outlines procedures for isolating and quarantining large numbers of
people, and for declaring the equivalent of "snow days" in which most public
activities and large gatherings would be barred to prevent the deadly virus
from spreading.
Slide 32:
Biodefense & Epidemiological Tracking
• Statistics:
World Health Organization (WHO)
Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
• News &
Information
• Research
and Development
• Bioinformatics:
Pathobiological Diagnostics
SARS: Findings by the Virology department of the University of Frankfurt -
Research
Coronavirus Sequencing:
Academy of Military
Medical Sciences and the Beijing Genomics Institute of Chinese Academy of
Sciences.
Sequence information
provided by collaborators at National Microbiology Laboratory, Canada, University
of California at San Francisco, Erasmus University, Rotterdam and Bernhard-Nocht
Institute, Hamburg facilitated this sequencing effort
Reference Notes:
Slide 33:
Communications / Resources
• SARS:
Legal Resource and Information Center
International Law, Communicable Diseases and the Geopolitical Objective of
Minimal Interference with World Trade and Travel.
• SARS: Veterinary
Public Health and Pandemic Disease
• SARS: Facing
the Challenge of HIV/AIDS
Locked Doors: The Human Rights of People Living with HIV/AIDS in China
• SARS: Lancet:
Early online publication
• CDC: Preventing
Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
Webcast.
• Triage of
Patients which may have Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
Emergency Medical Response, Canada.
Reference Notes:
Slide 34:
Monkeypox
• At least
19 people in three Midwestern states have contracted a disease related to
smallpox, marking the first outbreak of the life-threatening illness in the
United States. – Washington Post, Pox-Like Outbreak Reported 19 Ill in Midwest;
CDC Issues Alert, 6 June 2003
Reference Notes:
American Medical
Association: Monkeypox Outbreak - First in Western Hemisphere.
Slide 35:
Monkeypox
• Monkeypox
is a rare viral disease that occurs mostly in central and western Africa.
It is called “monkeypox” because it was first found in 1958 in laboratory
monkeys. Blood tests of animals in Africa later found that other types of
animals probably had monkeypox.
• Scientists
also recovered the virus that causes monkeypox from an African squirrel.
These types of squirrels might be the common host for the disease. Rats,
mice and rabbits can get monkeypox, too. Monkeypox was reported in humans
for the first time in 1970.
Reference Notes:
Monkeypox is
believed to have a mortality rate of between 1 percent and 10 percent, compared
with a mortality rate of about 30 percent for smallpox.
One of the key
concerns related to this outbreak and bioterrorism was the strain of
the virus:
Monkeypox in
Congo ( DRC ), Johannesburg, Thursday, October 01, 2002: The current
outbreak is considered by the WHO and MSF epidemiologists to constitute an
epidemic in the region (mortality rate = 37.5 per 100) and therefore worthy
of serious intervention.
Slide 36:
Monkeypox
• It was
noted that the importation of 600 animals from Africa under the classification
of pets, contributed to the transmission cycle. Who issued the permit(s)?
• The United
States Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service is only involved in permit issues related to import/transit of rodents
that have been inoculated with a known organism or vector of animal health
importance. Gambian Rats are not known to be vectors of pathogens of livestock
and poultry and, therefore, a permit from APHIS would not have been required
nor issued. - Thomas E. Walton, USDA/APHIS, Director, Centers
for Epidemiology and Animal Health
Reference Notes:
Thomas Walton
from USDA/APHIS was kind enough to answer this question presented to me from
a retired veterinarian from USDA/ARS, who served on the USDA- APHIS-VS "Vectors.
Organisms and Pathogens Committee" (5 questions and answers posted on ProMEDmail
Network: Emerging Infectious Disease Surveillance - www.promedmail.org).
In the answer
posted on ProMED, readers were advised to contact the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regarding their
permiting requirements pertaining to this issue.
As for the possible
source of monkeypox, APHIS currently is assisting the CDC and the FDA with
their investigation into the outbreak.
Slide 37:
Monkeypox – Vaccination
• Treatment:
No specific treatment recommendations are being made at this time. Smallpox
vaccine has been reported to reduce the risk of monkeypox among previously
vaccinated persons in Africa. CDC is assessing the potential role of postexposure
use of smallpox vaccine as well as therapeutic use of the antiviral drug cidofovir.
-- American Medical Association Information Resource: Monkeypox Outbreak
- First in Western Hemisphere
• In the
United States, approximately 25 percent (70 million) of the population would
be excluded from smallpox vaccination due to risk factors that include eczema,
immunodeficiency, or pregnancy, in themselves or in their close contacts.
Reference Notes:
Kemper et al.
did a "Back of the Envelope" presentation of possible risks associated with
smallpox vaccination for the Effective Clinical Practice, March/April
2002 issue for the American College of Physicians (ACP) journal [4]. They
concluded:
-- The
prevalence of eczema is at least 10 percent, or more than 28 million people
in the United States.
-- Immunocompromised
persons are at high risk for progressive vaccinia. We know of no overall estimate
for the number of immunocompromised individuals in the United States. This
number would include recipients of organ transplants (184 000 solid-organ
transplants in the 1990s), individuals with diagnosed and undiagnosed HIV
infection or AIDS (850 000), and patients with cancer (approximately 8.5 million).
Slide 38:
Biodefense & Epidemiological Tracking
• Quick
Reference: Monkeypox: Related Articles/Research
National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI)
PubMed, Indexed for Medline
CDC Updates and Advisories
Legal Discussion:
• Public Health
Legal Response and Preparedness: Centers for Disease Control
• Homeland
Security in the United States: Humanitarian Resource Institute Legal Resource
Center
Genomic
• Poxvirus
Bioinformatics Resource Center.
• Bioinformatics:
Pathobiological Diagnostics
Biodefense Discussions
Bioweapons, Bioterrorism and Biodiversity: potential impacts of biological
weapons attacks on agricultural and biological diversity.
Monkeypox – Potential as Bioweapon: US Army Center for Health Promotion and
Preventive Medicine.
Reference Notes:
Slide 39:
Emerging Infectious Diseases
• 80% of
"emerging" infections are animal based, outlining the significance of the
veterinary profession as a key player in collaborative research associated
with the international threat of bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases.
-- Martin Hugh Jones, Director, WHO Collaborating Center for Remote Sensing
and Geographic Information Systems for Public Health, LSU School of Veterinary
Medicine.
Reference Notes:
Pandemic influenza:
CDC resource
Influenza Pandemics: How They Start, How They Spread, and Their Potential
Impact:
-- The last two
pandemic viruses were combinations of bird and human influenza viruses. Many
persons believe that these new viruses emerged when an intermediate host,
such as a pig, was infected by both human and bird influenza A viruses at
the same time.
Heinen, Swine
influenza and public health implications:
-- "Around 1970,
following the human 'Hong Kong' flu pandemic, the human H3N2 virus was transmitted
to pigs. This human-like swine H3N2 virus continued to circulate, particularly
in Europe and Asia, but only sporadically caused clinical signs. It has only
started causing clinical disease since 1984, probably as a result of a reassortment
with the avian-like swine H1N1 virus.
Slide 40:
Agricultural Security
January 16, 2002:
Memorandum
• Though
significant progress has been made since the September 11 attacks, concerns
remain regarding the deliberate introduction of a Foreign Animal Disease
(FAD) in multiple locations and/or with multiple pathogens that could potentially
overwhelm an emergency response system.
Reference Notes:
Slide 41:
Agricultural Security – Contingency Plans
• In the
context of this assessment, it is crucial that solid contingency plans are
established that encompass the capacity to handle any threat against the
U.S. food and agricultural system.
• If an
outbreak is detected, the time required to diagnose FMD and initiate the appropriate
measures will be crucial to determining the outbreak's ultimate effect. These
measures would include a ban on all movements of susceptible animals that
might have been exposed to other animals, contact tracing, prompt and rigid
control of the movements of animals and animal products, vehicles, equipment
and people in a surveillance area around any outbreak area. Successful eradication
of the disease would require the commitment of government, livestock industries,
farmer's organizations and the general public. Research has suggested that
a one week delay could increase the proportion of infected premises from
18% to more than 90%. -- Ekboir: Potential Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease
in California: The role and contribution of animal health surveillance and
monitoring services.
Reference Notes:
Ekboir:
• The conditions
under which alternative policies would be preferable should be evaluated
in advance because once an outbreak has occurred, eradication strategies
are largely irreversible.
• Without
strong support of producers and producers’ organizations, it is impossible
to maintain proper surveil-lance and to conduct a successful eradication
campaign.
Slide 42:
Current Industry Concerns
• Range
of Threats for Risk Analysis
• Communication
Challenges
• Need for
Industry Alerts – Alternative Communication Strategies.
• Guidelines
for safeguarding products
• Biosecurity
guidelines
• Security
checks
• Recommendations
for the industry, policy implications and impact/role of the industry in the
event of a bioterrorist incident such as an FMD outbreak
• Quarantines,
import/export issues, potential impact for the biologics industry.
Reference Notes:
FEMA Directorate/Department
of Homeland Security level discussion regarding the gaps outlined by the industry,
the message was that the industry must engage itself in risk analysis, strategic
planning and development of contingency plans.
The intergovernmental
transition associated with the new Department of Homeland Security is challenging,
but it is coming together.
“If the system
ignores the challenges at the producer level, then that problem reflects
the size of the gap that exists for the grass roots level cooperation that
is vital for effective surveillance, containment and control of a foreign
animal disease outbreak.”
Slide 43:
Biosecurity Reference Library
• News
& Information
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum Island Animal
Disease Center: GAO Report, September 2003.
10.13.2003: Letter to Secretaries Veneman and Thompson: National Security
- Interruption of biodefense research.
• Guidelines
Biosecurity Fundamentals: Penn State University, College of Agricultural Sciences,
Vet Extension.
Biosecurity Resources: Documents, Risk Assessment, Biosecurity Presentations,
General Farm Biosecurity Links.
Initiatives in Biosecurity: Prepared by the Homeland Agro-Security Task Force,
Experiment Station Committee of the Board on Agricultural Assembly, National
Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges.
National Biosecurity Resource Center for Animal Health Emergencies: Purdue
University Web-based National Biosecurity Resource Center for Animal Health
Emergencies.
• Law
Legal Resource Center: Biodefense Reference Library
Legal Resource Center: U.S. and International Security
Reference Notes:
Veneman/Thompson
letter: Suspension of research involving select agents due to the inability
to “promptly” conduct security checks. Presented by the Association
of American Medical Colleges, Association of American Universities, Council
on Government Relations and National Association of State Universities and
Land Grant Colleges.
Slide 44:
2003 AVBC Conference
• Password
protected secure site providing easy online access to materials/resources
discussed in this presentation.
AVBC Conference
Resource Site
www.pathobiologics.org/xxxxxxx
User name: XXXXXXX
Password: XXXXXXX
Reference Notes:
Company: Pathobiologics
International
Stephen M. Apatow,
Consultant: Analysis, strategic planning and development associated with
risk management, infrastructure optimization, media and communication initiatives.
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